Operation Algeciras:
the full story. 
The most recent military assault against Gibraltar
took place around forty years ago, yet many of us knew little or nothing about
it until well after the event. It happened during the Falklands
campaign and this is how it came about.
At the start of 1982, the Argentinean junta faced almost
insurmountable problems; the economy was on the brink of collapse and the
population was baying for a return to democracy. Dictator General Leopoldo
Galtieri considered his options and he favoured invading the Falklands.
He could ride a wave of patriotic fervour and become a national hero
overnight... he thought. Just like our neighbours, he would distract the
populace from domestic problems, in his case by launching a daring military
adventure. His logic was based on the mistaken belief that Britain would not
respond. The military junta failed to comprehend the diplomatic double-talk
common amongst northern European nations, particularly in the area of reading
between the lines, to discern what was actually meant, from what was said. His
confidence was bolstered by the fact that the islands were just a 1000 miles
away – for ease of logistical support – but half the world away from Britain. We all
know the outcome... though with hindsight many believe Maggie could have solved
it with a few cruise missiles into their parliament, principal TV and power
stations.
When the British assembled the task force (Operation Corporate), the junta determined that an attack on Britain was
desirable but not achievable. A trawler full of explosives was unlikely to
reach the Houses of Parliament even if it made it into the Thames.
However, the British logistics tail was a long one and an attack against Gibraltar would result in ships being tasked to The Rock
and so deplete the flotilla. That is how Operation
Algeciras was conceived.

Admiral Jorge Anaya, former military junta member who commanded the
Argentine navy at the time of war, expressly ordered the offensive against Gibraltar. He already had his man; his team leader was to
be Maximo Nicoletti, a man with an impressive CV for acts of terrorism. In 1974 a limpet mine killed the Argentine
Federal Police Chief, Alberto Villar and his wife, whilst on board their yacht.
Less than a year later, in 1975, a brand new Type 42 destroyer, the Santissima Trinidad, under construction
in Rio Santiago shipyard, was sabotaged when a gelamon mine (a type of nitro glycerine) was detonated against her
hull, sinking her as she was fitting out. The damage delayed completion for a
year. Both attacks were carried out by Montoneros,
a left wing terrorist group who opposed the military government. The diver who led both attacks was Maximo
Nicoletti, an underwater explosives expert. Incidentally, Maximo’s Italian father
had served in the famous Decima Flottiglia MAS, the same commandos who attacked
Gibraltar with Maiale human torpedoes during WW 2.

Mussolini’s Decima
Flottiglia MAS
Nicoletti was subsequently captured and tortured at the infamous Escuela
de Mecanica de la Armada, (ESMA) where thousands of prisoners were tortured and
killed. Others were drugged and thrown alive from aircraft into the Atlantic. Nicoletti was given the opportunity to save his
skin by changing sides:
“I negotiated for my life, we all had to do it” he
said. Freed from ESMA in 1978, he then went to work for the junta assisting in
a variety of covert operations against Venezuela
and Chile,
before being selected to lead Operation
Algeciras.
This was the plan:
On April 24th, two team members Nicoletti and Antonio
Nelson Latorre, (el Pelado Diego) left
Eziza airport Buenos Aires and flew to Paris. Their false
passports were good, but not good enough, for the French Police suspected them.
However they allowed them to board a flight to Madrid; and probably alerted the Spanish and
British via Interpol. On arrival in Spain, the pair moved to an hotel
in Estepona to await the arrival of the two remaining team members. The false
passports were necessary as the team were officially disavowed by their
government and told that if they were caught they should state that they were
Argentine patriots working alone.
A few days later the other two commandos, ex-navy man Captain Hector
Rosales, a spy, who had overall control of the operation, the liaison with Admiral
Anaya and the only team member not an ex-Montonero, along with a man known-only
as Marciano (the Martian) were met in Madrid
and proceeded to the Argentine Embassy. There they collected two Italian made, 60
cms, hemispherical, limpet mines, each containing 25kg of tritonal (*). These had been shipped to Madrid via the diplomatic bag and were handed
over to the team by the Argentine military attaché. Some have suggested that
this occurred with the connivance of CESID, the (then) Spanish secret service,
but no evidence has yet emerged. The explosives, re-breather sets and the rest
of their kit was carefully transferred to Algeciras
by car. Carefully, because at that time Spain was still on high alert. They
had suffered an attempted coup a year earlier, when Antonio Tejero lead two
hundred armed Guardia Civil into the Congress of Deputies. And Spain was now about
to host the World Cup whilst simultaneously trying to run down Basque
terrorists from ETA. This led the team to use three cars, sending scouts ahead
to look for possible police checkpoints; just as the IRA did a few years later. After
a narrow escape at a police roadblock, they switched to minor roads, diverting
to Ronda and eventually entering San Roque via the station road. Switching
hotels every few days, they always paid in US dollars and swapped their hire
cars regularly. They purchased a rubber dinghy (from Corte Ingles) and fishing
gear to provide their cover. Their intention was to paddle out into the Bay,
apparently fishing, sink the dinghy and swim with the mines to their targets.
After planting the mines on British ships in the dead of night, they were to
swim ashore at La Linea, where Latorre would be waiting with a car, and drive
to Barcelona without waiting to observe the explosions.
The sabotage team spent the next week reconnoitring and then saw their
first target, a British minesweeper. This was turned down by Anaya as too
small. Next, a Liberian flagged oil tanker was selected, but again refused by
HQ as the environmental damage to adjacent Mediterranean coasts would enrage
the Spanish government and trigger international reactions. Finally on the 2nd May the frigate HMS Ariadne
arrived and was selected for the attack, only to be told by Anaya that a peace
settlement was in the offing and the attack was cancelled. That same day, HMS Conqueror
sank the General Belgrano; talks of
peace evaporated.
HMS Ariadne a Leander Class frigate.
The attack on Ariadne never
materialised because at that moment their plans unravelled. As Rosales and
Pelado visited the shop to extend the car-hire, their instructions to always pay
cash, in US dollars, had alerted a suspicious proprietor, who called the
police. At least that’s the official line… as always with these things there
are several versions of the truth. Another
version says the Guardia Civil had alerted car hire companies to watch out for suspicious
South American customers.
The British claimed to have known about it all along, from deciphered telephone
taps on the Argentine embassy in Madrid and after
tense discussions in the war cabinet (about whether Spain
could be trusted) alerted Spain
at the last moment. The Spanish claim that they were looking for South American
criminals known to be at large in the area. They say the whole operation was
police and Ministry of Interior led, and had no CESID involvement. CESID would
neither confirm nor deny anything… but were known to believe that campo Guardia
Civil were too well connected with local smugglers and had they been informed, then the game would be up. One local legend says the Guardia Civil thought they
were busting a new band of (unconnected) smugglers. So we will probably never
know the actual truth. However, it is true that by whatever means, the Guardia
Civil managed to frustrate what would have been a serious attack against Gibraltar.
What we do know is that is that Nicoletti and Marciano were asleep in
bed at the Hotel Guadacorte, Los Barrios, and awoke to find a room full of
policemen. Nicoletti was arrested but Marciano managed to escape and fled
across country to reach the Arroyo de la Mujer, two kilometres from San Roque,
where he met a police patrol coming towards him and was arrested.
Despite instructions, Nicoletti identified the team as Argentine
agents with the perhaps surprising result that the police attitude softened
when they realised that these were spies not crooks. The Spanish police chose not to make the
arrests public, nor did they see fit to inform their NATO ally, Britain, about
the plot. After discovering the identity of their captives the police even
dined out with them in a restaurant, at the prisoners’ invitation, en route to Malaga. They also allowed
Nicoletti to handle his own explosives; since they were not qualified to do so.
Eventually they were quietly escorted across Spain,
first to Madrid then the Canary Islands before
being allowed to leave on a flight to Buenos
Aires on their known-to-be-false passports.
We all know the outcome of the conflict but what happened to
Nicoletti? Well, he didn’t re-emerge publicly until March 1994, when he was
imprisoned as leader of a six man team who robbed an armoured car of the
TAB-Torres company. They fired on the truck using Belgian FAL automatic rifles
and quickly relieved it of 1.8 million pesos which disappeared never to be seen
again. After five years in prison, he was subsequently released, via some
judicial loophole (reasons unclear) and is now trying to reclaim the both the
weapons and 120K pesos that he claims were kidnapped
from him at the time of his arrest. Truth, they say is stranger than
fiction. Currently aged 70, he is now operating as a private investigator, for
high net worth clients with dubious connections.
(*) The explosive Tritonal is a castable mixture of 20-40%
aluminium and 60-80% trinitrotoluene (TNT). It is around 18-20% more effective
than TNT alone and ideal for limpet mines.
First published at History Society Chronicle 2020. Paul Hodkinson.
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