Sunderlands of the Cinderella Service.
Perhaps one of the most
extraordinary aircraft ever to grace our shores was the Short S.25
Originally commissioned for
coastal surveillance, the
This was a large aircraft;
measuring 85 ft 3” long and 32 ft 2” high with a wingspan of 112 feet 9 inches.
The aircraft was of metal construction, except for
most of the control surfaces, which were metal framed and covered by fabric. As
with the S.23, the
Rescued sailors being fed in a Sunderland Mess
The wings
carried four Pegasus XXII air cooled radial engines of 1010HP (753Kw) each and
accommodated six drum fuel tanks with a total capacity of 2,023 gallons (9,200
litres). Four more fuel tanks would later be added behind the rear wing spar to
give a total fuel capacity of 2,552 gallons (11,602 litres). This pushed the
The
To facilitate
bringing the aircraft on shore, (it was not an amphibian) two-wheeled struts
could be fitted to each side of the fuselage and a small two-wheeled trolley
with a tow bar could be attached under the rear of the hull. Despite their
empty weight of 13 and a half tons, many a
So how did these
remarkable aircraft come to be operating from
Initially
Coastal Command was supplied with the AVRO Anson, which lacked sufficient range
for deep ocean reconnaissance, alongside Vickers Vildebeests and SARO Londons; both
of which were obsolescent. Fortunately, they had three squadrons with suitable
aircraft, Sunderlands and Lockheed Hudsons, which could operate effectively in
the required roles. The RAF had received its first Sunderland Mk1 in June 1938,
with the second production aircraft flown out to
Throughout the war the Short Sunderland would play a
decisive role in the defeat of German U-boats in the
However, British
anti-submarine efforts were somewhat disorganised at the beginning of the war;
some early anti-submarine bombs were found to bounce up and hit their launch
aircraft. As A/S measures improved, an RAAF Sunderland performed the first
unassisted kill of a U-boat on 17th July 1940. This was the start of
their reputation as U-Boat killers.
First we might look at how U-boats operated during the first years of war. The normal procedure for U-boats attacking convoys at this time seems to have been as follows: The U-boat gained contact with the convoy during the day, either as a result of reports from long-range German reconnaissance aircraft, reports from other U-boats, or by sighting smoke, and they then shadowed the convoy at visibility distance on the bow or beam. When darkness had fallen, the U-boat trimmed down on the surface, closed the convoy, and endeavoured to reach a position broad on its bow. She kept very careful watch for the escorts and attempted to pass astern of those stationed on the bow of the convoy. The attack was pressed home as close as the U-boat captain dared, and it is possible that, in some cases, a firing range of about 600 yards was achieved. Having reached a firing position on the beam of the convoy, most U-boats increased to full speed, fired a salvo of four torpedoes, turned away still at full speed, firing stern tubes if possible, and retired as rapidly as possible on the surface in the direction considered safest. If their retreat was unseen, they might reload their torpedo tubes on the surface and attack again in the same manner later in the night.
Here is a
typical attack launched against HG53 whose 21 ships departed Gibraltar on 6
February 1941 bound for Liverpool and escorted by the destroyer HMS Velox and the Grimsby class sloop HMS Deptford. The convoy commodore
was Rear Admiral Sir OH Dawson aboard SS Dagmar. Whilst southbound
in African waters, at o435 on the morning of 9th February, the German U-37 sighted the convoy southwest of Cape St Vincent and torpedoed the British freighters
Co-operation between U-boats, aircraft and
surface vessels is well illustrated by this attack: U-37 reported
the convoy to Bordeaux-Merignac Air Base and commenced shadowing the convoy providing beacon signals for an airborne bomber unit (Kampfgesschwader 40). Five Focke-Wulf Condor bombers took off at dawn and found the convoy at noon
400 miles southwest of Lisbon. They bombed from an altitude of 150 feet because they
lacked bombsights. Each flight mechanic fired at their target ship with a
ventral machine gun during the approach to discourage anti-aircraft gunners;
but one of the bombers was hit in a wing fuel tank and crash-landed in
For an air
patrol to be able to locate submarines, on or near the surface, the crew’s
prime asset was the same as that of their foe; the Mk 1 eyeball. But they were
assisted by air-to-surface-vessel radar (ASV) which would detect a submarine on
the surface. Introduced to operations in January 1940, it could detect a submarine
at about 4 to 5 miles, in good conditions.
Experiments
proved that this relatively poor performance was caused by low gain antennae,
so developers installed a Sterba, or curtain array, which had about 2.5x the
gain of the original. This boosted performance to 10-15 miles. Whilst useful,
it also led the enemy to introduce a radar detection system so that they knew
when they were being painted by radar.
At night
however, whilst radar brought them to the target, they had to be able to see
it. The available aircraft lighting was inadequate and all they could do was
drop flares to illuminate the target. As returning crews explained, whilst able
to locate submarines they often failed to destroy them in the darkness. One of
those listening was Squadron Leader Humphrey de Verd Leigh, who proposed what
eventually became the Leigh Light. This was a 22-million candlepower, 24 inch
diameter searchlight, which in Sunderlands, was mounted below the wing. It was
effective enough to change the U-boat procedure of surfacing at night to
recharge their batteries, to daytime surfacing where at least they could see the
aircraft approach. Clearly, it increased their vulnerability.
To achieve any sort of success in the Atlantic and the western approaches patrols were regularly flown from Pembroke Dock, Mountbatten (Devon) Castle Archdale (N.I.), Stranraer (Galloway) Bowmore (Argyll and Bute) Bathurst (at the mouth of the Gambia River) Jui creek in SierraLeone and of course Gibraltar.
There were other
hazards to flying from the Rock; the wind conditions, which we all know about,
the swells, then the rough seas generated by equinoctial gales, but there were
other unexpected hazards as one pilot found:
“Our patrol on 5 November 1943 was an absolute nightmare.
Everything went wrong. First, within a short time I noticed that my Second
Pilot appeared to be asleep but I could not rouse him. Then, I could not raise
my Navigator on the intercom and it was not long before I realised that all of
my crew were comatose. It later turned out that all but me, had sandwiches
before take-off, which must have been poisoned. Although I was able to rouse
them, eventually, that was just the start of my problems. The radar was not
functioning properly then we found that the radio, too, wasn’t working. Having
decided to continue with the patrol regardless, we had complete engine failure,
which was later attributed to mishandling of our fuel supply when the aircraft
was prepared for the patrol. As we prepared to ditch, frantic efforts were made
to hand-pump fuel to the engines, which alternately sprang back into life such
that we were able to climb to about two thousand feet. Without radar, I had no
choice but to head in an easterly direction where I was confident of being able
to find the entrance to the Med.”
The difficulty of refuelling afloat at some distant locations.
Frequently overshadowed by more glamorous aircraft, the
Sunderland served throughout the war, and would later deliver nearly 5,000 tons
of essential supplies during the
First published at Gibraltar History Society 2020, revisited 2025. Paul Hodkinson.
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